This article reviews the scholarship on semi-presidentialism since the early 1990s.
This option is problematic, because it reintroduces the inherent ambiguity present in Duverger's original formulation of the concept. For example, what counts as a highly presidentialized system will differ from one person to another. Thus, most comparativists have rejected this option. The second option is to avoid definitional debates altogether and simply use a metric of presidential power. There are now many measures that generate such metrics. They include Metcalf, Shugart and Carey, and Siaroff. 18 These measures provide scores for the extent of presidential power across a range of countries. The effect of variation in presidential power can then be empirically tested. The scores are usually generated from the coding of country constitutions.
The main advantage of these measures is that, in theory, they are replicable.
There are two main disadvantages. The first is that constitutional powers often differ from actual powers, meaning that the scores for specific countries can be misleading. For example, Iceland often scores highly for presidential power, whereas the president is mainly a figurehead. By the same token, the French president often generates a low score, even though presidents there have often been very powerful. 19 The second is that the measures themselves are often capturing different dimensions of presidential power and lack validity for that reason. 20 Rather than trying to measure presidential power, the third option is to distinguish between semi-presidential countries on the basis of a further constitutional rule. Here, Shugart and Carey's distinction between presidentparliamentary and premier-presidential forms of semi-presidentialism has become dominant. 21 For Shugart, "Under premier-presidentialism, the prime minister and cabinet are exclusively accountable to the assembly majority, while under president-parliamentarism, the prime minister and cabinet are dually accountable to the president and the assembly majority".
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Broadly speaking, president-parliamentary countries have stronger presidents than premierpresidential countries. The advantage of this option is that, like the now standard definition of semi-presidentialism itself, the distinction between the two subtypes of semi-presidentialism can be based on a publicly available constitutional rule that requires no specialist country knowledge. The disadvantage is that, as with measures of presidential power, constitutional divisions of power sometimes do not neatly match actual divisions. Generally, the second and third ways of distinguishing between semi-presidential countries are used, but there are problems with both.
The first wave of semi-presidential studies generated a considerable amount of work and some often heated debates. The debate about the definition of semi-presidentialism itself has now been resolved at least to the satisfaction of most comparativists, though even among this set of scholars there is an ongoing debate about the best way to distinguish between countries with semipresidential constitutions in terms of presidential power. However, this shift of emphasis raises its own question. If the concept of semi-presidentialism is of purely taxonomic interest, then is it redundant? Given concepts are fundamental to the scientific enterprise and they are particularly important in the social sciences, the answer is fundamentally no. The post-Duvergerian definition of semi-presidentialism provides the basis for a more reliable taxonomy of regime types than Duverger's original definition. Therefore, if the aim is to identify the institutional differences between semi-presidentialism, presidentialism, and parliamentarism at a conceptual level, then only the post-Duvergerian definition of semi-presidentialism will do in this regard. However, if the aim is to capture the effect of institutional differences between countries in empirical terms, then operationalizing semi-presidentialism as a discrete explanatory variable will not do at all. At the very least, Shugart and Carey's distinction between premierpresidentialism and president-parliamentarism can serve as the basis for potentially valid conclusions about the effect of the variation in presidential power within semi-presidentialism. Perhaps better still, a more fine-grained measure of presidential power should be used. There are after all, differences in presidential power across the set of presidential countries as well as semipresidential ones and, indeed, there are differences in presidential power in parliamentary republics, as Tavits has clearly shown. 23 Thus, semipresidentialism remains part of the arsenal of political concepts at political scientists' disposal, but empirically it should be operationalized very carefully with a focus on the effect of variation in presidential power. We now turn to empirical studies of semi-presidentialism since the early 1990s.
THE SECOND WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION
The debate about the definition of semi-presidentialism and the classification of countries as semi-presidential was important because in the 1990s there was a rapid increase in the number of countries with a semi-presidential constitution.
By itself, this increase was enough to generate a certain academic interest, but the distribution of semi-presidential countries also changed, encouraging a particular research agenda. Rather than being mainly confined to rich, consolidated, European democracies, semi-presidentialism was introduced in many newly democratic countries, including newly established countries in the former USSR and the former Yugoslavia. Given this distribution, scholars focused overwhelmingly on the impact of semi-presidentialism on democratization. This generated a second wave of semi-presidential studies that began in the early 1990s.
In retrospect, Shugart and Carey's volume Presidents and Assemblies was the first second-wave study.
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They countered the general criticism of presidentialism by arguing that countries with directly elected presidents were not necessarily harmful to democracy if presidential institutions were crafted carefully. As part of this argument, they pointed to the potential benefits of premier-presidentialism in contrast to president-parliamentarism, which they classed among the potentially dangerous institutional configurations. They relied on only anecdotal evidence, but their volume was extremely influential. At the time, Shugart and Carey rejected the label of semi-presidentialism. Instead, they
stated that "what Duverger refers to as semi-presidential, we designate premierpresidential".
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They also made it clear that president-parliamentarism was separate from premier-presidentialism, implying that it was not a form of semipresidentialism either.
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The result was that even though Shugart and Carey were sympathetic to premier-presidentialism as a form of constitutional design for new democracies, their argument was rarely interpreted as an argument in favour of either semi-presidentialism or a particular form of semi-presidentialism.
Only later did Shugart explicitly and systematically classify both premierpresidentialism and president-parliamentarism as sub-types of semipresidentialism. 27 Indeed, this is now the standard way in which Shugart presents these concepts. and that also included a discussion of semi-presidentialism.
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Again based on anecdotal evidence, Linz was willing to concede that some forms of semi-presidentialism might be conducive to democratization, notably where the directly elected president was a figurehead and where the system functioned like a parliamentary system. In general, though, he expressed his opposition to French-style semi-presidentialism where the president had quite considerable powers, which was how the concept was generally understood at the time, given, as we have seen, Duverger's definition was still dominant. This argument was reiterated in Linz and Stepan's comparative volume. 32 Again based on largely anecdotal, qualitative country studies, they pointed to the particular problems of cohabitation within semi-presidentialism. This is the situation where the president and prime minister are from opposing parties or coalitions and the president's party or coalition is not represented in the government. Pointing to Poland as an example, they argued that this situation created the potential for power struggles within the executive that were liable to threaten fragile new democracies. With Shugart and Carey's work not being interpreted as an argument in favour of semi-presidentialism or at least one type of semipresidentialism, Linz's negative judgment about the effect of semipresidentialism on democratization came to dominate thinking in this regard.
Among scholars and constitution-builders, the clear recommendation was that semi-presidentialism should be avoided. This position was challenged by Giovanni Sartori.
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He addressed the issue of cohabitation. Whereas Linz emphasized the likelihood of conflict within the executive when the majority in the legislature was opposed to the president, Sartori pointed to the French case and noted that cohabitation caused power to shift to the prime minister, leaving the president a figurehead. This 'headshifting', he suggested, was a source of institutional flexibility, leading him to suggest that cohabitation could lead to a 'rebalancing' within the executive.
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On the basis of this argument, Sartori has come be seen as one of the first people to support semi-presidentialism. However, two points need to be stressed. The first is that Sartori's support for semi-presidentialism was equivocal. Certainly, he preferred it to presidentialism, but he refused to choose between semipresidentialism and parliamentarism as his preferred form of government.
35
More than that, Sartori also noted that there were potential problems with a Frenchstyle dual authority structure. 
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This article explicitly identified premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism as two forms of semi-presidentialism, meaning that work by scholars of semi-presidentialism was now consistent with the work of Shugart and Carey. This article also stressed the importance of institutional variation not just within semipresidentialism, but within premier-presidentialism too. To do so, Roper measured the power of presidents in a number of premier-presidential countries using a variation of Shugart and Carey's index of presidential power.
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This was important because it changed the terms of the debate that had been dominated by Linz and Sartori. They gave the impression that the effects of semipresidentialism were unidirectional, whereas Roper stressed that variation within semi-presidentialism was likely to be associated with variation in outcomes. This is the equivalent of the two-step process that we saw in terms of the debate about the definition and classification of semi-presidential systems in the previous section. Importantly, Roper also applied his argument to a mix of young and old democracies in Europe. In this way, he did more than just extrapolate from the experience of consolidated democracies. From this point on the research agenda for the second wave of semi-presidential studies was set.
The aim was to explain the extent to which semi-presidential institutions affected the success or failure of new democracies; this question was approached from the principle that there was variation in presidential power within semipresidentialism; and empirically tests of the effect of such variation needed to include consideration of new democracies.
With the research agenda set in this way, the more recent work in the second wave of semi-presidential studies has been characterized by two developments. First, whereas previous work on semi-presidentialism and democratization in new democracies tended to draw conclusions on the basis of anecdotal evidence from single-country or small-n studies, now there has been a shift to medium-and large-n comparison. So, Moestrup presented the first statistical test of the performance of presidential, parliamentary and semipresidential countries, distinguishing between the effect of premier-presidential and president-parliamentary forms of semi-presidentialism.
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Since then, large-n studies testing the effect of semi-presidentialism and/or variation within semipresidentialsim have been undertaken by various writers. 40 We should note, though, that some studies still operationalize a 'mixed' regime type variable, which we can understand to correspond to semi-presidentialism but which does not take account of any variation within this regime type. 41 Second, whereas before the research question was couched primarily in terms of which one of presidentialism, parliamentarism or semi-presidentialism was most conducive to the success of new democracies, now this question has been asked in terms which form of semi-presidentialism is most conducive to this end. So, Elgie and Elgie and Schleiter have focused solely on the effects of institutional variation within semi-presidentialism, finding evidence that premier-presidentialism is more conducive to democratization than president-parliamentarism. 42 These studies do not aim to draw any conclusions about the performance of semipresidentialism relative to other regime types, but they do wish to draw conclusions about the performance of semi-presidential countries relative to each other.
In general, the shift from anecdotal accounts of consolidated democracies to much more rigorous large-n comparative studies of new democracies has improved our chances of drawing general conclusions about the average effect of institutional variation on democratization. Even so, despite the apparent increase in scientific rigour, we still cannot be sure about the effects of semipresidentialism and variation within it relative to the effects of presidential and parliamentary institutions. For example, Moestrup finds that parliamentary systems perform significantly better than semi-presidential system and that there is no significant difference between semi-presidentialism and presidentialism. 43 By contrast, Hiroi and Omori argue that the parliamentarism performs worse than presidentialism, though there is some evidence that semi-presidentialism performs better than presidentialism. 44 For their part, Cheibub and Chernykh conclude that semi-presidentialism has no significant effect relative to other regime types. 45 The studies by Maeda and Svolik can be interpreted as coming to a similar conclusion.
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In short, when we focus solely on more recent secondwave studies, it would be perilous to drawn any definitive conclusions about the general effect of semi-presidentialism and variation within it relative to presidentialism and parliamentarism. Results are very sensitive to the time period of the study, the countries included, how democracy and the collapse of democracy are defined, the variables included in the estimations, the proxies used for the concepts being captured by those variables, what estimation technique is used, and so on. So, notwithstanding the inherent lack of validity in conclusions that some scholars still wish to draw about the effect of semipresidentialism in general on democratization, we should maintain a healthy degree of skepticism about any conclusions concerning the impact of variation within semi-presidentialism as well the effect of such variation relative to presidentialism and parliamentarism. In short, we still cannot be sure about the causal effect of particular institutions.
This conclusion generates two further challenges for the study of semipresidentialism. The first concerns the focus of inquiry. Partly because robust conclusions about the effect of institutions on democratization have been difficult to identify, some scholars are now privileging bottom-up, society-centred research rather than top-down institutional accounts.
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For example, rather than analyzing the effect of formal institutions, scholars are increasingly examining the impact of informal institutions and non-institutional factors. As a result, the study of semi-presidentialism risks being crowded out of the research agenda.
The second challenge concerns the method of inquiry. Positivist political science has been hit by the identificationist revolution.
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Concerns about how to identify causal relationships have posed general problems for political analysis, particularly the study of institutions. One response has been to focus on experimental methods. Yet elite-level institutions are difficult to study in this way, not least because of fundamental issues regarding the absence of randomized assignment. Consequently, there is the real risk that academic attention will shift to topics that are easier to study in the lab or in the field, such as studies of voting behavior and ideology, and away from institutions, such as presidentialism, parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism.
The study of semi-presidentialism needs to respond to both of these challenges. To this end, there is still room for essentially qualitative, singlecountry or small-n studies of the effect of elite-level institutions on democratization. However, such studies need to be based on a rigorous research design. Lydia Beuman's study of semi-presidentialism in Timor-Leste is an excellent example in this regard. there has been plenty of lab-based work on the effect of electoral systems. With a certain degree of imagination, the basic principles of this work could be applied to the study of the effects of presidentialism, parliamentarism and semipresidentialism, including variation within semi-presidentialism. Overall, there have been profound developments in the study of semi-presidentialism and democratization since the early 1990s. In order to remain relevant, work in this area has to respond to broader developments in the discipline. Otherwise, there is the real prospect that work on semi-presidentialism and democratization will become marginalized and increasingly irrelevant.
THE THIRD WAVE: PARTIES, POWER AND PARLIAMENTS
The study of semi-presidentialism in consolidated democracies started at a very early stage. Writing well before the wave of democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Duverger was concerned with explaining why countries with the same basic constitutional structure operated in very different ways. Why was France so presidentialized, when in Austria, Iceland and Ireland the system operated in a parliamentary-like manner, even though the president was directly elected? To answer this question, he identified four factors: "the actual content of the constitution, the combination of tradition and circumstances, the composition of the parliamentary majority, and the position of the president in relation to this majority".
50
As we shall see, these factors remain central to the analysis of thirdwave semi-presidential studies. In one sense, this means is that what we are calling the third wave of semi-presidential studies actually predates the beginning of the second wave. In another sense, though, with attention initially focused on the issue of democratization, the systematic study of semipresidentialism in consolidated democracies was largely ignored throughout the 1990s. Now, though, it has become the principal focus of attention. This is the sense in which we can identify it as the third wave of semi-presidential studies. and what other factors interact with presidential power to help to bring about differential outcomes? Samuels and Shugart argue that the direct election of the president does make a difference. 51 In particular, it affects party politics, which in turn has an impact of other aspects of the political process. They state: "to the extent that the constitutional structure separates executive and legislative origin and/or survival, parties will tend to be presidentialized" (emphasis in the original). 52 Separate origin refers to the situation where there is a direct presidential election that is held separately from legislative elections, albeit perhaps simultaneously. Separate survival "means that a party or legislative majority cannot remove a sitting president". 53 The separate origin of the executive and the legislature means that what it takes for the president to be elected is not necessarily what it takes for individual party deputies to be elected or for the party as a whole to gain a majority there.
Presidential candidates are likely to adopt a vote-seeking strategy that emphasises public goods because they need to win a large proportion of the national electorate. 54 By contrast, the party's legislative candidates may adopt a policy-seeking strategy or they may emphasize constituency goods. The separate survival of the executive and the legislature also has implications. Here, presidents "have little to fear from their own colleagues" because they cannot be dismissed. This position has been challenged by Tavits. 57 She argues that, by itself, the introduction of direct elections does not make a difference to political outcomes.
To illustrate this argument she takes a sample of European parliamentary democracies and semi-presidential democracies with weak presidents. Using the share of non-partisan ministers in government as her proxy for presidential activism, she shows that there is no significant statistical relationship between directly or indirectly elected presidents and the level of presidential activism. 58 More qualitatively, she shows that presidents in some parliamentary systems, such as Hungary, have more power than presidents in some semi-presidential systems, such as Ireland. Taking the example of Slovakia, she also shows that the introduction of direct presidential elections in a parliamentary system does not necessarily empower the president. Instead, drawing on the concept of political opportunity structures, she states that "constitutional powers are the most important aspect of the opportunity structure", 59 but she argues that the incentives for presidential activism will be greater when political consensus is low, notably during periods of cohabitation or divided government, and when other political institutions are weak, particularly during periods of coalition and minority government. This formulation is reminiscent of Duverger's way of thinking about the effect of the relationship between the president and the parliamentary majority that was presented 30 years earlier. That said, the fact that Tavits questions the idea that direct presidential elections makes a difference to political outcomes leads at least one scholar to conclude that her analysis challenges the "continued use of the concept" of semi-presidentialism no less. 60 What are we to conclude about the debate over the effect of direct presidential elections? First, we can certainly continue to hold the position that the direct election of the president makes a taxonomic difference. As we have seen, in a post-Duvergerian world the presence or absence of direct presidential elections has considerable taxonomic implications, but no necessary empirical implications. Those who hold to the post-Duvergerian definition make no claim that, by itself, direct election makes any difference to political outcomes. They merely claim that it makes a difference to the taxonomic classification of a country. For such scholars, when the Czech Republic introduced the direct election of the president, it shifted from a parliamentary to a semi-presidential regime without implying that it had any implications for empirical outcomes.
Thus, we can reject the idea that Tavits' work challenges the very concept of semi-presidentialism. This idea is based on a misreading of post-Duvergerian scholarship. Second, while taxonomically the matter is clear-cut, whether or not the introduction of direct election has an effect of political outcomes still remains open to empirical investigation. This is the third-wave equivalent of the two-step process that we identified previously. For their part, Samuels and Shugart claim that is does make an empirical difference, whereas Tavits argues that it does not. Third, even though Samuels and Shugart and Tavits seem poles apart in terms of their answer to the question of whether direct presidential elections matter, they are not as radically opposed as they might at first appear. For one, Tavits compares parliamentary presidents to only a limited subset of premierpresidential presidents, namely ones with very few constitutional powers. In effect, she has deliberately truncated her sample. If she had considered the full set of premier-presidential countries, i.e. including those with strong presidents, such as France and Romania, then she may have found that direct election was a significant predictor of presidential activism. In addition, Samuels and Shugart are making a probabilistic rather than a deterministic argument. They can perfectly well claim that direct election matters in general, but that it is does not always matter. Therefore, they can happily conclude that some parliamentary presidents may indeed be stronger than some semi-presidential presidents as Tavits shows, without this meaning that in general direct election does not have an effect. More importantly, though, even though Samuels and Shugart emphasize the empirical importance of the separate origin of the executive and the legislature, they focus on more than just the importance of direct election. As we have seen, they show there is variation in outcomes between presidentialism and president-parliamentarism and, particularly, between these two different separation-of-powers regimes and premier-presidentialism, yet all three have directly elected presidents. So, direct election alone cannot explain such variation.
In fact, when they state: "to the extent that capture of a separately elected presidency is important for control over the distribution of the spoils of office and/or the policy process, party behavior and organization will tend to mimic constitutional structure, giving rise to 'presidentialized' parties", we can interpret them as saying that their theory applies only to relatively strong presidents. 61 Indeed, we might even interpret them as saying that when a separately elected presidency is not important, i.e.
when there are Tavits-style weak presidents, then they do not expect direct election to make a difference. Overall, while there is certainly a difference of emphasis between Shugart and Carey and Tavits, the debate about the effect of direct presidential elections is not as polarized as it might at first appear.
In this way, we can see how the debate between Shugart and Carey and Tavits is at least partly a debate about the effect of presidential power. More generally, the impact of variation in presidential power has been a particular focus of third-wave studies. This work has been applied both solely to the population of semi-presidential democracies and to a broader population of semi-presidential and usually parliamentary countries. There are many different studies that include semi-presidential countries as part of a large-n analysis. For example, Hicken and Stoll show how the size of the presidential prize, i.e. the variation in presidential power in presidential and semi-presidential regimes, affects the legislative party system in interaction with the sequencing of presidential and legislative elections and the effective number of candidates at the presidential election. 62 Elgie and Fauvelle-Aymar show how variation in presidential power in semi-presidential systems affects the level of turnout at presidential and legislative elections with turnout generally higher at the former than the latter above a certain threshold of presidential power. 63 While there are various individual studies of this sort, there has been a more focused attention on the relationship between presidential power and both government formation and termination.
In terms of government formation, Protsyk demonstrates that cabinet formation in premier-presidential regimes is "much more predictable" than under president-parliamentarism. 64 Under premier-presidentialism, the choice of prime minister "more consistently reflect[s] the preferences of the parliamentary majority". 65 Building on work by Amorim Neto and Strøm, Schleiter and MorganJones demonstrate that variation in the president's constitutional power affects the outcomes of the cabinet formation process under semi-presidentialism. 66 Preferring to operationalize a more fine-grained measure of presidential power than the simple president-parliamentary/premier-presidential dichotomy, they show that the greater the president's power, the more control the president has over cabinet composition. Equally, the greater the fragmentation of party groups in parliament, the greater the president's control over formation outcomes.
However, if the cabinet formation process immediately follows a parliamentary election, then the president's influence is reduced. Schleiter and Morgan-Jones also compare the outcome of cabinet formation under semi-presidentialism with parliamentarism. 67 They find that the level of non-partisan ministers is higher under the former relative to the latter. They account for the variation in ministerial non-partisanship by reference to differences in the powers of presidents under semi-presidentialism and to the more complex nature of the government formation process under semi-presidentialism due to the president's involvement under this type of regime.
In terms of government termination, Sedelius and Ekman have used a mixture of secondary reports and an expert survey to determine whether there is a link between intra-executive conflict in Eastern Europe and cabinet instability. 68 They find that there is an association and that intra-executive conflict is particularly destabilizing in president-parliamentary countries relative to premier-presidential countries. By contrast, in a comparative study of parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes in Europe Schleiter and MorganJones find no relationship between the type of semi-presidential regime and government survival. 69 However, they do find that if the president has the power to dissolve the legislature then there is a greater likelihood of governments being replaced between elections. Contrary to this finding, Cheibub and Chernykh show that variation in government stability in semi-presidential and parliamentary countries is more affected by the electoral system than by whether or not the president is directly elected or by the powers of the president. 70 Overall, whereas there does seem to be a basic consensus that presidential power matters for the process of government formation, the same consensus does not exist in relation to government termination. Consistent with Duverger's work in the 1970s, presidential power is not the only variable that has been shown to matter. In particular, scholars have stressed the relationship between the president and the parliamentary majority, leading to work about the effect of both cohabitation and minority government on presidential outcomes. The standard way of thinking about cohabitation was set by Pierce. 71 Based on a study of the French case he showed that cohabitation reduced the power of the president and increased the level of conflict within the executive between the president and the prime minister. More recent third-wave studies have built on this work. For example, focusing on semi-presidential governments in Eastern Europe Protsyk shows that cohabitation increases the level of intra-executive conflict. 72 He measures the extent of such conflict by counting the examples that were recorded in East European Constitutional Review.
As the study of institutions progressed with the development of principal-agent approaches and so on, so too did the work on semi-presidentialism and the variation within it. Now, though, there have been profound ideational developments. When scholars discuss issues such as democratization, there is an increasing tendency to adopt a bottom-up analysis that focuses on the impact of social actors, new media, and so forth. Scholars of semi-presidentialism need to demonstrate the importance of institutional effects relative to these other factors if the research of the last 20 years is to remain relevant. Finally, the study of semipresidentialism runs the risk of being undermined in the face of the identificationist revolution. For example, how will the study of semipresidentialism fare in the trend towards a more experimental positivist political science? The answer is not immediately apparent, but in order to remain relevant semi-presidential scholars have to engage with these broader methodological developments.
That said, the study of political institutions is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. The work of coalition presidentialism in Latin America has the potential to be applied more broadly and semi-presidentialism is one obvious area of interest. In this regard, the work on the presidential toolkit has the potential for a much broader application and would suit the study of semipresidential countries very well. 81 The ongoing work on comparative constitutions challenges certain received ideas about semi-presidentialism, but also provides the opportunity for debate as well as new data-led studies. 82 In turn, the study of semi-presidentialism has much to offer to the work about the presidentialization and/or personalization of parliamentary systems. Overall, while we can now identify three waves of semi-presidential studies after 20 years of scholarship, we can also look forward to more work and new waves of scholarship in the years to come. 
